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Parties and Offenses in the Military Justice
System: Court-Martial Jurisdiction
The military justice system has traditionally conducted trials of those
persons connected with the military services who have been accused under
military rules of criminal acts.' These defendants are tried at courts-martial
composed of military officers and presided over by military judges, without
the right to trial by jury or to indictment by grand jury.2 In recent years
serious challenges to the exercise of military jurisdiction both by those who
have claimed not to have military "status," thus avoiding court-martial
jurisdiction of the person, 3 and by those who have argued that certain
offenses were not cognizable in military courts,4 have been heard in both
civilian and military courts. While the system of military justice is explicitly
created by the Constitution,5 the principal justification for the existence of
this separate system has been the proposition that military life engenders
unique problems which require a distinctly military means of resolution. 6
This rationale has provided a basis for attacking court-martial jurisdiction.
The constitutional bases of military law in general and court-martial jurisdiction'in
particular are found in U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8; art. II, § 2; amend. V.
Article I, § 8 gives Congress the power "To make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces." Article II, § 2 established the President as
commander-in-chief of the army and navy. The fifth amendment excepts from the requirement
of grand jury indictment "cases arising in the land or naval forces ...."
The statutory source of the present military justice system is the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1970). The UCMJ establishes court-martial and military
justice procedures, defines court-martial jurisdiction, enumerates substantive offenses, and
authorizes the President to prescribe maximum punishments and further procedural rqles. The
President has exercised this authority by promulgating the Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States, 1969 (rev.) [hereinafter cited as MCM]. The current edition of the MCM was given the
force of law by Exec. Order No. 11, 476. Additionally, the branches of the armed forces and the
Department of Defense promulgate regulations further implementing the UCMJ.,and MCM.
Failure to obey such regulations may be a court-martial offense. UCMJ art. 92, 10 U.S.C. § 892
(1970).
2See generally H. MOYER, JusTIcE AND THE MILITARY, §§ 2-585 to 609 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as MOYER]. Almost all courts are composed of officers. When the defendant is an enlisted
man he has the option pursuant to UCMJ art. 25 (c)(1), 10 U.S.C. § 825 (c)(1) (1970k, of electing
to have one-third of the court composed of enlisted personnel. However, because senior
noncommissioned officers are almost always named, this option is rarely pursued. See MOYER §
2-598.
SSee, e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866):
Every one connected with these branches of the public service is amenable to the
jurisdiction which Congress has created for their government, and, while thus
serving, surrenders his right to be tried by the civil courts. All other persons, citizens
of states where the courts are open, if charged with crime, are guarapteed the
inestimable privilege of trial by jury.
Id. at 123 (emphasis in original).
4See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
5See note 1 supra.
'Apart from convenience and feasibility, there is an especially important reason for
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Historically, military jurisdiction was deemed best suited for cases to
which military judges brought a special expertise. The need for this
military expertise seemed to exist whenever a member of the armed forces
was accused of a violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,7 the
substantive and procedural criminal statute of the military; and until 1969,
status as a serviceman was sufficient to vest a military court with the power
to try an accused serviceman for any offense. In that year, however, this
broad jurisdictional authority was limited by the United States Supreme
Court in O'Callahan v. Parker.8 The Court held that court-martial.
jurisdiction required that two concurrent jurisdictional bases be present:
personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction. More specifically,
O'Callahan holds that a serviceman's rights to grand jury indictment and
to trial by jury outweigh the military authority to exercise court-martial
jurisdiction over q serviceman, even though the accused is a member of the
military, unless the offense charged is "service-connected." 9 If it is, then
the offense is within court-martial jurisdiction under the UCMJ,10 and the
exercise of that jurisdiction is within constitutional bounds. It has been
left primarily to the military courts in general, and to the Court of Military
Appeals in particular, to sort out the impact of the O'Callahan decision
and its progeny.'
This note will discuss the decisions of COMA during its 1975-76 term
in three areas of jurisdiction: the question of what constitutes a
having service personnel subject to trial by military courts. There is a much higher
probability that the persons who hear the case will understand and be responsive to
the problems involved.... Most important, a military court will often be better
qualified than a civilian body to grapple with the problem of imposing a sentence
on the accused, for it will have more acquaintance with the purposes which
punishment should serve and more understanding of the seriousness of his crime in
the military context.
R. EVERET, MILITARY JUSTICE IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES 5 (1956). For
a discussion of the Supreme Court's thoughts on the necessity for separate systems, see
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17-18 (1955).
710 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1970). See generally Willis, The Court of Military Appeals; Born
Again, 52 IND. L.J. - (1976) supra, Sherman, The Civilianization of Military Law, 22 ME.
L. REV.. 3 (1970).
8395 U.S. 258 (1969).
91d. at 272-74.
Few would deny that the military justice system is not set up for the same purposes as the
civilian system. Implicit in the differences between the two systems is the characterization of the
military system as providing the justice of necessity. The special needs of the military have long
been recognized as the justification for the specialized procedures of the court-martial system.
The implication is that where those special needs are absent, court-martial jurisdiction should
not attach. This result is predicated upon the assumption that military law is not necessarily
equal to civilian law. This was the theme of Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion in O'Callahan,
which characterized the expansion of military discipline beyond its proper domain as "a threat
to liberty," and described courts-martial as "singularly inept in dealing with the nice subtleties
of constitutional law." Id. at 265.
IOUCMJ arts. 17-21, 10 U.S.C. §§ 817-21 (1970).
"Relford v. Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, 401 U.S. 355 (1971), is the
principal civilian case after O'Callahan.
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constructive enlistment giving rise to a militry status to which personal
jurisdiction of a court-martial may attach; 12 the exception to the subject
matter requirement of service connection which permits trial by court-
martial of certain offenses because committed "overseas"; 13 and the doctrine
finding service connection, and thus subject matter jurisdiction, over drug
related offenses even though they occur outside the military environment.'4
Presently COMA appears to be contracting court-martial jurisdiction.
Whether on the ground of fairness in a particular case or as a result of the
mandate of the Supreme Court's decisions in recent years, the court seems
to be responding to what are in some cases unnecessary discrepancies
between civilian and military systems of justice. In some areas, such as
speedy trial, search and seizure, and self-incrimination, COMA has adopted
for the military system constitutional doctrines developed in civilian courts
or by COMA itself.' 5 But an additional method of harmonizing the
coexistence of the two separate systems, one apparently still evolving, is the
development of jurisdictional doctrines that divert from the military justice
system those who either are not in fairness "members" of the service or who
do not commit crimes which are military in essence. An example of this
process is found in the 1975-76 cases which COMA decided concerning the
application of the doctrine of constructive enlistment.
JURISDICTION OF THE PERSON WITH MILITARY STATUS:
"CONSTRuCTIvE ENLISTMENT"
Constructive enlistment is a doctrine which confers court-martial
jurisdiction over a defendant who would otherwise not be subject to such
jurisdiction because of a defective enlistment that was either void or
voidable.' 6  A defect in enlistment procedures can operate to prevent
military jurisdiction of the individual because it negates the military status
required for personal jurisdiction.'7 But such lack of status has frequently
12See United States v. Russo, 23 C.M.A. 511, 50 C.M.R. 650 (1975); United States v.
Barrett, 23 C.M.A. 474, 50 C.M.R. 493 (1975). See notes 16-36 infra & text accompanying.
1"United States v. Black, 24 C.M.A. 162, 51 C.M.R. 381 (1976). See notes 37-50 infra & text
accompanying.
HUnited States v. McCarthy, 25 C.M.A. 30, 54 C.M.R. 30 (1976). See notes 51-90 infra &
text accompanying.
"-See Note, The Right to Counsel at Summary Courts-Martial: COMA at the Crossroads,
52 IND. L.J. - (1976), inyra; Note, Searches and Seizures in the Military Justice System, 52
IND. .L.J. - (1976), infra, Note, Self-incrimination in the Military Justice System, 52 IND.
L.J. - (1976), infra.
"See note 27 infra; MO YER, supra note 2, §§ 1-210 to 220.
17See Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960):
Without contradiction .. .military jurisdiction has always been based on the
"status" of the accused, rather than on the nature of the offense. To say that
military jurisdiction "defies definition in terms of military 'status' " is to defy
unambiguous language of Art. I, § 8, cI. 14, as well as the historical background
thereof and the precedents with reference thereto.
Id. at 243 (citation omitted).
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been held to have been cured by the defendant's acquiescence in his
apparent status as a member of the military subsequent to the enlistment
challenged as defective, the acquiescence giving rise to a constructive
enlistment.' 8 The typical objection of the accused has been that the
enlistment was void from the outset because of the violation of some
applicable regulation. In such an instance, the court is called upon to
examine the circumstances surrounding the enlistment and to decide
whether sufficient subsequent acquiescence existed to override the challenge.
Until 1974 COMA took the position that if the regulation violated was
for the benefit of the armed services,' 9 the enlistment contract was not void,
but merely voidable at the option of the government. In 1974 COMA
changed its approach to this issue when it considered two such cases.
In United States v. Catlow, 20 the accused was tried at a court-martial
and convicted following an extended unauthorized absence. The accused's
enlistment had been the product of a choice put to him by a juvenile court
judge between "five years indefinite in jail" or a three-year term in the
Army. An Army recruiter had obtained his release from jail to enable him
to "fill out the papers and take the test." After Catlow's induction the
juvenile charges were dismissed. It was clear that this was a violation of
the Army's own regulations and that the enlistment was therefore defec-
tive.21 The government sought to raise a constructive enlistment on the
ground of Catlow's acceptance of army pay, medical attention and mess
See also Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). See generally MOYER, supra note 2, §§ 1-205
to 225.
IsFactors relevant to a finding of accused's acquiescence in apparent military status have
been said to include wearing the uniform, receiving pay, performing basic duties, application
for a service I.D. card, participation in serviceman's insurance program, application for
special training and written acknowledgment of induction. See Unitecd'tates v. HaT, 17
C.M.A. 88, 37 C.M.R. 352 (1967); United Statesy. Wilson, 44 C.M.R. 891 (ACMR 1971). Federal
courts may attach somewhat different significance to these and other factors in collateral
attack on court-martial jurisdiction, especially where the accused has continuously asserted
the military's lack of jurisdiction over him. See, e.g., Cox v. Wedemeyer, .192 1F. 2d 920 (9th
Cir. 1951); United States cx rel. Caputo v. Sharp, 282 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Pa. 1968); United
States. ex rel. Wiedman v. Sweeney, 117 F. Supp. 789 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
19See, e.g., United States v. Russo, 23 C.M.A. 511, 50 C.M.R. 650 (1975).
The military and the courts had taken the traditional position that when a regulation
contained a disqualifying factor merely as a convenience to one of the parties, e.g., a
requirement for a certain level of vision before entering the armed forces, it was a matter
which in any given situation that party might waive. In the particular context of constructive
enlistment, this means that when the standard of the regulation is not met and enlistment
nevertheless ensues, the enlistment contract is voidable at the option of the party whom the
regulation was intended to benefit, i.e. the armed forces in this example.
2023 C.M.A. 142, 48 C.M.R. 758 (1974).
2
'Army Regulations specifically forbade enlistment of persons
who as an alternative t6 . . . incarceration in connection with the charges, or to
further proceedings relating to adjudication as a youthful offender or juvenile
delinquent, are granted a release from the charges at any stage of the court
proceedings on the condition that they will apply for or be accepted for enlistment
in the Regular Army.
AR 601-210, . ,2-6, at 2-12 n.2, May l, 1968.
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privileges, but COMA found this insufficient in light of Catlow's persistent
protestations against continued service. 22 The outcome was to enable
Catlow to challenge successfully defective enlistment which previously
would have been voidable only by the military because the regulations were
to benefit the Army.
One week later, in United States v. Brown,23 the court held that in the
interest of fairness two breaches of duty precluded the government from
relying on the jurisdictional base of constructive enlistment. First, Brown's
recruiter failed to observe regulations concerning notarization of the
parental consent form, resulting in Brown's successful forgery of his
father's signature. Second, upon being informed of Brown's fraudulent
minority enlistment during his second week of basic training, his com-
manding officer failed to take adequate measures. Combining the two
instances of governmental misconduct, the court proceeded to estop the
government to raise a constructive enlistment upon Brown's attaining
enlistment age.
In Catlow, recruiter misconduct alone was not enough to bar the
possibility of a future constructive enlistment. 24 Catlow's post-induction
protests were also relied on by the court. In Brown, the combination of
recruiter misconduct and subsequent misconduct on the part of the military
itself after discovery of the defective enlistment was sufficient to negate
reliance on constructive enlistment. The net effect seems to be to raise at
least a presumption of a void enlistment which no constructive enlistment
will save where the original enlistment was forced as in Catlow,25 or where
there has been governmental misconduct leading to a wrongful continu-
ation of a void enlistment. Where both of these elements are present there
can be no constructive 'enlistment.26
2223 C.M.A. at 146, 48 C.M.R. at 762. Cf. United States v. Graham, 22 C.M.A. 75, 76, 46
C.M.R. 75, 76 (1972); United States v. Overton, 9 C.M.A. 684, 688, 26 C.M.R. 464, 468 (1958).
s23 C.M.A. 162, 48 C.M.R. 778 (1974). Brown enlisted at age 16 by using a false birth
certificate and forging his father's signature on a consent form Normally under such
circumstances, a constructive enlistment will arise from acquiescence in the status after the
enlistment age of 17 is achieved. But because of governmental misconduct, the government
was estopped to pply the rule.
2423 C.M.A. at 146, 48 C.M.R. at 762. In Catlow COMA did not discuss potential
distinctions in this context where the enlistment was obtained by recruiter misconduct on the
one hand and civilian coercion on the other, possibly because it was dear from the Army
Court of Military Review opinion below that the military recruiter who contacted Catlow was
aware of the judge's "offer." United States v. Catlow, 47 C.M.R. 617, 618 (ACMR 1973). What
the court clearly was not saying is that all fraudulent enlistments have the same effect for
future constructive enlistments as Catlow's had. Fraudulent enlistments can occur in a variety
of contexts not associated with recruiter misconduct, the most common being an underage
enlistment. In such situations the normal rules of constructive enlistment Apply, in the
absence of subsequent governmental misconduct.
25See United States v. Dumas, 23 C.M.A. 278, 49 C.M.R. 453 (1975) (no reasonable basis
for constructive enlistment where 17 year-old's recruiter, probation officer and juvenile judge
arranged his enlistment as alternative to confinement, without parental knowledge or
consent).26United States v. Brown, 23 C.M.A. 162, 48 C.M.R. 778 (1974).
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Constructive Enlistment During the 1975-76 Term
The court continued the erosion of the availability of the doctrine of
constructive enlistment in the 1975-76 term when it took up two more cases
which raised the problem. In United States v. Barrett,27 the appellant had
elected to enter the Army in 1967 rather than serve a four-year term in a
reformatory following a juvenile conviction. The recruiting officer had
sought out Barrett and advised his enlistment. In a per curiam opinion,
COMA held the enlistment void at its inception on the authority of the
Catlow decision. However, the court went further and held that the
recruiter's improper conduct was of such a type as to prevent the
government from asserting constructive enlistment based on subsequent
acquiescence. This was definitely not the holding of Catlow, although the
circumstances in the two cases are remarkably similar. In effect, what the
Barrett court did was to separate recruiter misconduct from subsequent
misconduct on the part of the military and to declare either sufficient to
prevent the government from using constructive enlistment as a juris-
dictional base.28
In the second case of the 1975 term, United States v. Russo, 29 the
appellant suffered from a reading disability which disqualified him from
enlistment. However, the recruiter supplied Russo with answers for the
Armed Forces Qualification Test. The "void-voidable" distinction, 0
applicable since the benefit of the disqualifying regulation presumably
redounded solely to the armed services, was rejected by the court on the
ground that the regulation was not solely for the benefit of the armed
services, but was also to protect unfit applicants from entering an
2723 C.M.A. 474, 50 C.M.R. 493 (1975).
28As previously noted, see note 19 supra & text accompanying, prior to Catlow and
Barrett an enlistment which was obtained in violation of some regulation was not, solely on
that ground, void ab initio. Rather, the enlistment contract was voidable at the option of the
party not in violation of the regulation. If, for example, the recruiter failed to disqualify an
enlistee for medical reasons when directed to do so by the pertinent regulations, the enlistee
could void the contract at his option. The government, however, could not void the
enlistment on its instigation, on the theory that a party cannot set up its own misconduct as a
"breach" of the contract. But in Barrett, COMA clearly held recruiter misconduct to be the
sort of misconduct which renders the contract void in the sense that a constructive enlistment,
which is in essence merely the denial of the power to void by the enlistee, cannot revive it.
2923 C.M.A. 511, 50 C.M.R. 650 (1975).
3 tCases in which enlistments have been held to be void involve persons who were below
the minimum statutory age when they enlisted and at the time they committed the offenses for
which court-martial jurisdiction is asserted. No constructive enlistment can arise before the
disabling condition is removed. See United States v. Blanton, 7 C.M.A. 664, 23 C.M.R. 128
(1957). Enlistments where parental consent is required but not obtained are voidable at the
parents' option. E.g., In re Morrissey, 137 U.S. 157 (1890). In addition, it has always been
held that a regulation "solely for the benefit of the service" violated by the enlistee in a
fraudulent enlistment is only voidable at the option of the service. See United States v.
Overton, 9 C.M.A. 684, 26 C.M.R. 464 (1958). Catlow did not destroy this distinction; it
merely interpreted a regulation as not being solely for the benefit of the service. 23 C.M.A. at
145, 48 C.M.R. at 761.
[Vol. 52:167
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environment in which they would not be able to function effectively.31
More interesting is the court's treatment of the government's conten-
tion, advanced in order to meet Russo's argument that recruiter misconduct
should prevent the government from invoking constructive enlistment, that
the court should adhere to the old Supreme Court view that:
"[e]nlistment is a contract, but it is one of those contracts which changes
the status, and where that is changed, no breach of the contract destroys
the new status or relieves from the obligations which its existence
imposes.... [I]t is a general rule accompanying a change of status, that
when once accomplished it is not destroyed by the mere misconduct of one
of the parties, and the guilty party cannot plead his own wrong as working
a termination and destruction thereof."3 2
COMA dismissed this argument, reasoning that in order to effect a
voluntary change in status from civilian to soldier, a valid enlistment
contract or a constructive enlistment is a prerequisite. Neither was evident
here, for having foregone the void-voidable distinction as a bar to Russo's
challenge, it was clearly a case of a defective enlistment, and on the basis of
Barrett (and presumably Brown) the facts thus prevented a constructive
enlistment from being relied on. Moreover, the court held alternatively
that under certain circumstances a fraudulent enlistment contract is void on
grounds of public policy:
Because fraudulent enlistments are not in the public interest, we
believe that common law contract principles appropriately dictate that
where recruiter misconduct amounts to a violation of the fraudulent
enlistment statute,.., the resulting enlistment is void as contrary to public
policy. Hence the change of status alluded to in Grimley never occurred in
this case.33
Conclusion
The cases decided in the 1975-76 term both confirmed COMA's
hostility to the application of the doctrine of constructive enlistment where
s123 C.M.A. at 512, 50 C.M.R. at 651.
3223 C.M.A. at 513, 50 C.M.R. at 652, quoting In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 151-52 (1890).
Grimley involved a petition for habeus corpus by a soldier contending a court-martial was
without jurisdiction to try him because his enlistment was void for overage.
3323 C.M.A. at 513, 50 C.M.R. at 652 (citations omitted). The fraudulent enlistment
statute alluded to is UCMJ art. 84, 10 U.S.C. § 884 (1970): "Any person subject to this chapter
who effects an enlistment ... of any person who is known to him to be ineligible for that
enlistment ... because it is prohibited by law, regulation, or order shall be punished as a
court-martial may direct."
This seemingly broader-sounding alternative holding is actually the narrower position
because of the relevant standard of conduct on the part of the recruiter. A material element of
the fraudulent enlistment statute, violation of which the court implies will void an enlistment
on public policy grounds, requires knowledge on the part of the recruiter that a subject is
ineligible for enlistment.
1976]
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recruiting service personnel have violated enlistment regulations, and held
forced enlistment void ab initio. On the one hand, these developments
are in keeping with the historical justification of the constructive enlist-
ment doctrine: acceptance of military status which because of its voluntary
nature supercedes formal requisites, compliance with which was defective
in some manner.3 4 On the other hand, the newly adopted position that
certain violations of regulations foreclose the application of the doctrine
and the adamant insistence on considerations of fairness to the defendant3 5
regardless of mechanical analysis indicate that COMA is moving toward a
more realistic analysis of the voluntariness of enlistment. 36 While these
holdings doubtless will serve to constrict court-martial jurisdiction, COMA
may well be acting in the interest of preserving the integrity of the separate
military system of justice. That is, the narrowing of bases for finding
personal jurisdiction is consonant with the constriction of court-martial
jurisdiction in terms of subject matter that occurred during the same term.
THE "OVERSEAS" EXCEPTION
TO THE SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION REQUIREMENT
Following O'Callahan v. Parker,37 court-martial jurisdiction could not
be founded solely upon the accused's status as a serviceman. Under
O'Callahan, servicemen were entitled to the same rights to indictment by
grand jury and trial by jury as civilians when the crime alleged was not
service connected. 38 Though military status was still a prerequisite to
34See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 17 C.M.A. 88, 37 C.M.R. 352 (1967). See also United
States v. Scheunemann, 14 C.M.A. 479, 34 C.M.R. 259 (1964).
35 See, e.g., Appendix to United States v. Catlow, 23 C.M.A. 142, 146-47, 48 C.M.R. 758,
762-63 (1974). Judge Advocate General Prugh explains some of the consequences to the
individual who makes an unfortunate decision to enlist.
16The court emphasized voluntarism in the sense of a willing submission to all facets of
military life. The acquiescence that heretofore formed the basis of a constructive enlistment
actually presented, in many cases, the only practical course of action open to an enlistee.
Rather than focus on that acquiescence, the court has instead chosen to view the initial choice
regarding submission to military authority as the operative fact.
There is a possible side effect of these recent cases. Constructive enlistment, as now
viewed by the court, may turn out to be an unfortunately two-edged sword. With the
""Volunteer Army" concept in a preeminent position now, the military may attempt to use
disqualifying conditions such as those suggested by COMA in order to trim what it feels is
"dead wood" so as to realize personnel cutback goals. Presumably, if the disqualifying
conditions do not render an enlistment void, but voidable, and prevent a constructive
enlistment from ever arising, the armed forces could discharge such personnel. It remains an
open question whether COMA will permit the new outlook to work in this fashion.
COMA has subsequently decided two cases in this area in per curiam opinions. Both held
that court-martial jurisdiction was lacking and merely cited Russo. United States v. Muniz, 23
C.M.A. 530, 50 C.M.R. 669 (1975); United States v. Burden, 23 C.M.A. 510, 50 C.M.R. 649
(1975).
37395 U.S. 258 (1969).
38Id. at 272-73.
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personal jurisdiction, the service connection of the offense, or subject
matter jurisdiction, became the primary issue. 39
One application of these two interrelated factors, status and subject
matter, to circumstances where the constitutional purposes of O'Callahan
cannot be served by avoiding court-martial jurisdiction has come to be
referred to as the "overseas exception" to the O'Callahan service connection
test. The past cases construing the overseas exception have held that to
determine whether there is court-martial jurisdiction over a non-service
connected offense occurring outside the United States, two questions must
be answered: 1) Is the accused a member of the armed services? 2) Is the
offense contrary to American civilian penal statutes having effect in the
foreign country so as to be cognizable in an American civilian court?40 If
the first question is answered in the affirmative, but the second in the
negative, the overseas exception applies and court-martial jurisdiction
attaches regardless of service connection. 41
In this situation, the alternatives are trial by court-martial, trial by
"In O'Callahan, Justice Douglas set out some factors relevant to the service connection of
an offense:
In the present case petitioner was properly absent from his military base when
he committed the crimes with which he is charged. There was no connection - not
even the remotest one - between his military duties and the crimes in question. The
crimes were not committed on a military post or enclave; nor was the person whom
he attacked performing any duties relating to the military. Moreover, Hawaii, the
situs of the crime, is not an armed camp under military control, as are some of our
far-flung outposts.
Finally, we deal with peacetime offenses, not with authority stemming from
the war power. Civil courts were open. The offenses were committed within our
territorial limits, not in the occupied zone of a foreign country. The offenses did
not involve any question of the flouting of military authority, the security of a
military post, or the integrity of military property.
395 U.S. at 273-74 (citation omitted). These factors were further explicated by the Supreme
Court in Relford v. Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, 401 U.S. 355 (1971). See note 59
infra.
O0As the UCMJ applies to servicemen overseas, UCMJ art. 5, 10 U.S.C. § 805 (1970), a
court-martial has subject matter jurisdiction over an offense "in all places." Applying
O'Callahan's test to other offenses to determine whether the court-martial could have subject
matter jurisdiction because of service connection required a determination of whether an
American civil court could have tried the accused. See generally MOYER, supra note 2, §§ 1-620
to 629; United States v. Weinstein, 19 C.M.A. 29, 41 C.M.R. 29 (1969); United States v.
Goldman, 18 C.M.A. 389, 40 C.M.R. 101, reh. den. 18 C.M.A. 516, 40 C.M.R. 228 (1969). In
Weinstein COMA declared: "The offenses occurred in a foreign country and are not contrary
to American civilian penal statutes having effect in Germany. Consequently, the constitu-
tional limitation on court-martial jurisdiction delineated in the O'Callahan case is inap-
plicable." 19 C.M.A. at 30, 41 C.M.R. at 30.
4'Adhering to; this method of analysis, COMA had little trouble reaching the same result
where American civilian courts were open and functioning in a foreign country but had no
power to take jurisdiction over the offense. United States v. Ortiz, 20 C.M.A. 21, 42 C.M.R.
213 (1970).
COMA has also made it clear that whether a serviceman is at the crime situs for military
or personal reasons is immaterial; he still maintains status as a member of the military. United
States v. Newvine, 23 C.M.A. 208, 48 C.M.R. 960 (1974).
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foreign court,42 or no trial at all. The benefits of indictment by grand jury
and trial by jury sought to be preserved by O'Callahan cannot be conferred
on the accused serviceman; there is therefore no purpose in determining
whether the alleged offense was service connected. However, an offense
may be a violation of both the UCMJ and American civilian penal statutes
that have effect, usually pursuant to treaty, in a foreign country. In that
case, because civilian courts could take jurisdiction, thereby making
available grand jury indictment and jury trial, subject matter jurisdiction
or service connection must be found before a court-martial can take
jurisdiction. Otherwise, the case must be heard in a civilian court. Without
the overseas exception, there would be a large number of acts which would
be offenses under the UCMJ but which would not be offenses under
civilian penal statutes.4 3 COMA has reasoned that the Supreme Court in
O'Callahan could not have intended such a result, and that therefore trial
by court-martial of such offenses is constitutionally valid even in the
absence of service connection.44
United States v. Black: Subject Matter Jurisdiction and
"Overseas" Offenses
This line of inquiry was refined somewhat by COMA's decision in the
1975-76 term in United States v. Black.45  In Black the accused was
42Some concurrent jurisdiction situations result in trial of servicemen by the country in
which the offense occurred, pursuant to treaty. See MOYER, supra note 2, §§ 1-620 to 629.
41This large number of offenses results from heavy use of the "general article" in
charging military offenses. UCMJ art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1970) provides:
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and neglects to
the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a
nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital,
of which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of
by a general, special, or summary court-martial, according to the nature and degree
of the offense, and shall be punished at the discretion of that court.
This "general article," as it is called, is of particular significance to the armed services in the
situation of overseas offenses. There, a charge under the general article is not held to be
bound by the strictures of state and federal law, as is usually the case for offenses which
operate generally to ease the prosecution's burden of proof, relax the specificity with which
the elements have to be proved, and lower the standard for sufficiency of evidence which must
be met to sustain a conviction. See MOYER, supra note 2, §§ 5-120 to 170.
"United States v. Keaton, 19 C.M.A. 64, 41 C.M.R. 64, 67 (1969). In Keaton, which
involved an assault on a civilian in the Philippines, military jurisdiction was the result of a
treaty. 61 Stat. 4019, 4025, (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1775, amended August 10, 1965 (16 U.S.T.
1090, T.I.A.S. No. 5851).
The overseas exception is one area where the military and federal courts appear to be in
accord, the federal courts have adopted the rationale used by COMA - the availability of
indictment and trial by jury - and have upheld court-martial jurisdiction when convictions
were challanged on collateral attack. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Jacobs v. Froehlke, 481
F.2d 540 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Hemphill v. Moseley, 443 F.2d 322 (10th Cir. 1971); Swift v.
Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, 440 F.2d 1074 (10th Cir. 1971); Gallagher v. United
States, 423 F.2d 1371 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Williamson v. Aldridge, 320 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Okla.
1970).
4524 C.M.A. 162, 51 C.M.R. 381 (1976).
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convicted of conspiring with a Vietnamese national while in Saigon to
smuggle heroin into the United States. When he returned to the United
States, Black sent to one Beech, still in Vietnam, currency and a letter
which were to be delivered to the Vietnamese co-conspirator. Instead,
Beech informed the authorities.
In support of trying Black by court-martial rather than in a civilian
court, the government contended that Black's completion of a substantial
portion of the crime overseas was sufficient to subject his offense to
military jurisdiction. Black argued that the overseas exception was
inapplicable, since the conspiracy was not complete until execution of the
overt act in the United States, the sending of the letter to Beech. The court
held that since the overt act was done in the United States, the offense was
actually not committed in Vietnam for court-martial purposes.46
After a careful reading, Black appears to be consistent with the prior
constructions of the overseas exception. In asking whether the offenie had
been legally committed in this country, the Black court was simply
attempting to determine whether American civilian courts would have had
jurisdiction of the offense, absent an applicable American statute in effect
in Vietnam which would have allowed American civil court jurisdiction to
attach in any case. The effect of the alternative holding in Black is less
clear. The court also held that the offense was "contrary to American civil
penal statutes in effect in Vietnam so as to be cognizable in a United States
civil court." 47 This, of course, renders unnecessary any inquiry into the
situs of the offense.
Nevertheless, Black is valuable for the light it sheds on COMA's view of
the purpose of the overseas exception and its relationship to the O'Cal-
lahan opinion:
The purpose of O'Callahan is to insure indictment and trial by jury,
and the rationale of the overseas exception ... is that those benefits are not
available in foreign courts, anyway, so trial by court-martial is as close as
is possible to affording all the rights and privileges to an accused in
Anglo-American jurisprudence. Where our federal statutes prohibit
conspiracies or attempts to import controlled substances, where that is the
essence of the charged offense, and where an American civil court has
jurisdiction over the person of the accused ... the rationale of the overseas
exception is not satisfied, for under the O'Callahan reasoning, a court-
martial of this appellant is not as close as is possible to get toward
affording him all the jury-related benefits of our constitutional law.48
Conclusion
There can now be no doubt that the sole purpose of the overseas
"Id. at 164-65, 5i C.M.R. at 383-84.47 d. The court gave extraterritorial effect to 21 U.S.C. § 952 (1970), prohibiting
importation of controlled substances, and 21 U.S.C. § 963 (1970), proscribing attempts or
conspiracies to violate narcotics laws.
4824 C.M.A. at 166, 51 C.M.R. at 385 (emphasis in original).
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exception is to operate to preserve as many of an accused's constitutional
rights as is possible when the rights which concerned the O'Callahan court,
indictment by grand jury and trial by jury, arb unavailable because of the
extraterritoriality of the offense. It remains to be seen, however, whether
the majority's emphasis on the twin constitutional thrusts of O'Callahan
could be the basis for an actual expansion of court-martial jurisdiction by
COMA, in apparent contravention of Justice Douglas' intent in O'Cal-
lahan. One member of the court has argued that since for some offenses
right to grand jury indictment and, trial by jury do not exist, an inquiry
into service connection of these offenses is inappropriate, whether com-
mitted overseas or not.4 9 The logic behind this position is that if the
guarantees of O'Callahan cannot be implemented in a particular case, that
offense should be an exception to the service connection requirement. This
position has not yet been adopted, but neither has it been expressly
rejected.5 0 Perhaps in a future case the majority will be unable to avoid this
issue. The most obvious fact situation which squarely poses this problem
is a non-overseas, non-service connected offense which the military seeks to
prosecute, and which is of such a "'minor" nature that neither indictment
nor jury trial is available as a matter of civilian law.
T4E SERVICE CONNECTION OF OFF-POST DRUG OFFENSES
A challenge to court-martial jurisdiction of off-post drug offenses on
the ground of a lack of service connection presents one of the most
interesting questions in military law today. This is an area where COMA
and the federal courts have found themselves in direct and continued
conflict.52  The typical scenario has a member of the armed forces
committing some drug offense, e.g., use, possession, transfer, sale or
importation, while off-post, out of uniform, and off-duty. As will be
demonstrated, the slight variations in fact situations often result in totally
different resolutions of the jurisdictional issue.
Prior to O'Callahan v. Parker,52 on the few occasions when COMA
addressed the jurisdiction question where drug offenses were involved, the
uniform holding was that drug offenses were triable by court-martial. 53
This result was predicated on the presumed "disastrous effects occasioned
419United States v. McCarthy, 25 C.M.A. 30, 54 C.M.R. 30 (1976) (Cook, J., concurring).
5While Judge Cook has taken this position, the other judges did not respond to it. Id. Cf.
notes 80-89 infra & text accompanying.51Moym, supra note 2, § 1-445.
52395 U.S. 258 (1969). The Supreme Court held that in order for an offense to be triable
by court-martial it must be "service connected." See note 9 supra & text accompanying..
531n United States v. Brice, 17' C.M.A. 336, 38 C.M.R. 134 (1967), the court said:
There exists no specific codal provision regarding the possession, use, or sale of
marihuana. When charged, it is normally treated as a violation of [Article 134].
The Manual [for Courts-Martial] discussion of offenses encompassed by Article 134
included the admonition that "It is a violation of this article WRONGFULLY to possess
marijuana or a habit forming narcotic drug."
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by the wrongful use of narcotics on the health, morale and fitness for duty
of persons in the armed forces." 54
As a consequence of this attitude, when the Supreme Court established
the service connection test in O'Callahan, COMA had little trouble
justifying a blanket rule finding jurisdiction over the offenses of posses-
sion, use, or sale of drugs by a service member whether committed on or
off-post. 55 In those cases following O'Callahan where the service connec-
tion of an army drug offense was an issue, COMA summarily found
jurisdiction.56  Service connection was also held to exist where one
serviceman, by delivering drugs, served as a "conduit" for the unlawful
possession of another serviceman. 57
Id. at 340, 38 C.M.R. at 138 (emphasis in original). See also United States v. West, 15 C.M.A.
3, 6-7, 34 C.M.R. 449, 452-53 (1964). The Manual for Courts-Martial also provides that
"[p]ossession or use of marihuana or a habit forming narcotic drug may be inferred to be
wrongful unless the contrary appears." MCM 213b, 1969 (rev.).54United States v. Williams, 8 C.M.A. 325, 327, 24 C.M.R. 135, 137 (1957).55United States v. Beeker, 18 C.M.A. 563, 40 C.M.R. 275 (1969), is the leading case.
Apart from the specifics of Federal and State law, use of marihuana and
narcotics by military persons on or off a military base has special military
significance. . . .As a result, the circumstance of "no military significance,"
described in O'Callahan as an essential condition for the limitation on court-martial
jurisdiction, is not present ....
... Like wrongful use, wrongful possession of marihuana and narcotics on or
off base has singular military significance which carries the act outside the
limitation of military jurisdiction set out in the O'Callahan case.
Id. at 565, 40 C.M.R. at 277.
'However, COMA refused to extend the "Beeker rule" to cover the unlawful importation
and transportation specifications with which Beeker was charged, since the prohibition
against these offenses "involves different considerations from the act of possession and entails
the exercise of governmental powers different from regulation of the armed forces." Id. at 565,
40 C.M.R. at 277.
The offenses of importing marijuana into the counry and concealment and facilitation of
the transfer of marijuana are contrary to 21 U.S.C. § 176a (1970). COMA's holding that
importation of drugs is not, in itself, service connected has been rigorously adhered to. See
MOYER, supra note 2, § 1-447 and cases cited therein.
56See, e.g., United States v. DeRonde, 18 C.M.A. 575, 40 C.M.R. 287 (1969); United States
v. Boyd, 18 C.M.A. 581, 40 C.M.A. 293 (1969); United States v. Castro, 18 C.M.A. 598, 40
C.M.R. 310 (1969). In Castro, the accused was discovered using and possessing drugs in the
course of apprehension for-being AWOL. To the extent that the rationale applied was that
drugs are harmful because of their effect on health, morale and fitness for duty of persons in
the armed forces, the relevance of the AWOL factor is unclear. It might be argued that the
armed forces' interest in maintaining health, morale and fitness for duty is greatly diminished
in the case of a serviceman who has already been AWOL for an extended period. In any event,
the court did not address this issue. Castro was still considered good law two years after
Relford by the Army Court of Military Review. United States v. Truelove, 47 r.M.R. 691
(ACMR 1973).57United States v. Rose, 19 C.M.A. 3, 41 C.M.R. 3 (1969). This holding reflects the
determination of COMA to base service connection on the "disastrous effects" proposition
announced in Williams.
COMA has even gone so far as to uphold court-martial jurisdiction to try a service
member for sale of marijuana to a serviceman-informer. See United States v. Sexton, 23 C.M.A.
101, 48 C.M.R. 662 (1974). The court rejected the Tenth Circuit's holding in Councilman v.
Laird, 481 F.2d 613 (1973), rev'd sub nom Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975), that
an outward indication that the informer was performing a military duty was needed to show
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Relord and Beyond:
The Federal Courts and the Military Courts At Odds
The Supreme Court decision in Relford v. Commandant, U.S. Disci-
plinary Barracks8 attempted to delineate more specifically the factors to be
considered in implementing O'Callahan.5 9 While it failed to indicate
service connection. However, United States v. Morley, 20 C.M.A. 179, 43 C.M.R. 19 (1970),
held in part that a court-martial had no jurisdiction to try the accused for off-post sale of
drugs to a civilian. But to be consistent with the "conduit" rationale of Rose, COMA would
have to find service connection in such an offense if there appeared to be a possibility of resale
or transfer to the military community. It is not clear that this would be the result. It is also
unclear what would be the result where the "civilian" to whom the transfer was made was
actually an undercover agent. The Courts of Military Review have reached varying results on
the issue of sale to an-undercover agent. See United States v. Mueller, 40 C.M.R. 862 (ACMR
1969) (purchaser a serviceman and defendant knew it); United States v. Butler, 41 C.M.R. 620
(ACMR 1969) (purchaser a civilian undercover agent); and United States v. Johnston, 41
C.M.R. 461 (ACMR 1969), all upholding jurisdiction to try a sale to an undercover agent.
Contra, United States v. Blancuzzi, 46 C.M.R. 922 (NCMR 1972), where the Court of Military
Review resolved the issue of service connection of a drug sale to an informer in this way:
"Service connection" in the case of delivery or sale of a prohibited drug off base
in the civilian community stems from the fact that the accused in selling the drug
serves as a conduit for the unlawful possession by another service member with its
concomitant deleterious effect on the health, morale, and fitness for duty of persons
in the armed forces. In the case sub judice, since the sale was made to a CID agent,
albeit a noncommissioned officer, it cannot be said that the latter's possession as a
result of the sale was "unlawful" or that it adversely affected the health, morale, or
fitness of the agent. Absent these ingredients the "service connection" link is
missing and court-martial jurisdiction is lacking.
Id. at 923 (citation omitted).
58401 U.S. 355 (1971).
591n listing the factors to be given weight in a determination as to service connection, Mr.
justice Blackmun, speaking for a unanimous Court said:
We stress seriatim what is thus emphasized in the [O'Callahan] holding:
1. The serviceman's proper absence from the base.
2. The crime's commission away from the base.
3. Its commission at a place not under military control.
4. Its commission within our territorial limits and not in an occupied zone of a
foreign country.
5. Its commission in peacetime and its being unrelated to authority stemming
from the war power.
6. The absence of any connection between the defendant's military duties and the
crime.
7. The victim's not being engaged in the performance of any duty relating to the
military.
8. The presence and availability of a civilian court in which the case can be
prosecuted.
9. The absence of any flouting of military authority.
10. The absence of any threat to a military post.
11. The absence of any violation of military property. One might add still another
factor implicit in the others:
12. The offense's being among those traditionally prosecuted in civilian courts.
Id. at 365.
The original issue framed by the parties was the retroactivity of O'Callahan, since
Relford's case became final more than 5 i years prior to O'Callahan. But when the Court
found service connection on the facts, it declined to reach this issue. This issue was reached in
Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665 (1973), where the Court declined to apply O'Callahan
retroactively after utilizing the three-pronged analysis of Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1970).
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which factors were conclusive or what weight each should be given,60 the
decision did provide a clearer blueprint for finding the service connection
of an offense. It would have been reasonable to expect this clarification to
result in a more sophisticated analysis of drug related offenses. However,
COMA generally continued to apply the blanket rule to hold that all drug
offenses which could be related to possession by military personnel were
triable by court-martial. 61
COMA, thus initially refused to avail itself of the tools of analysis on
service conndction questions made available in Relford. The same cannot
be said, however, of the federal courts. As a general matter, the federal
courts have eschewed a blanket rule such as COMA used. The federal
courts conducted the kind of analysis contemplated by O'Callahan even
before the clarifying decision of Relford.62 Some federal courts seized upon
the distinction between marijuana and "hard" drugs6' and were not
6 For an amplification of this and other problems left unanswered by Relford, see
MOYER, supra note 2, § 1-410.
6'See, e.g., Rainville v. Lee, 22 C.M.A. 464, 47 C.M.R. 554 (1973). A service member was
convicted of wrongful use, possession and sale of marijuana while off duty, off post, and out
of uniform. After citing the narrow exceptions to Beeker, the court held the case to be directly
controlled by Beeker. Id. at 464-65, 47 C.M.R. at 554-55.
In some of the post-Relford cases, COMA has used an abbreviated analysis of the
Relford factors. See, e.g., United States v. Teasley, 22 C.M.A. 131, 46 C.M.R. 131 (1973), in
which near the end of its opinion finding no service connection in the offense of possessing a
hypodermic syringe for the purpose of injecting heroin while in the civilian community,
COMA engaged in its cursory Relford analysis: "Since the act charged was committed in the
civilian community, had no independent service significance, and was an offense in the
civilian community cognizable in the courts of Maryland, it could not be tried by court-
martial." Id. at 132, 46 C.M.R. at 132. Even if a full Relford analysis had been undertaken
here, however, it is doubtful that service connection would have been found. At least seven
out of twelve of the factors delineated in Relford cut against service connection here. The only
possibre factor which points the other way is the "flouting of military authority." Even
this, though, would rest on the somewhat specious logic that Teasley was flouting military
authority be injecting heroin while wearing fatigues, contrary to a post regulation as to attire
while off post in an off duty status.
Nevertheless, for the most part the blanket rule of Beeker, see note 57 supra, has been
reaffirmed. But see United States v. Morley, 20 C.M.A. 179, 43 C.M.R. 19 (1970); United States
v. Hughes, 19 C.M.A. 510, 42 C.M.R. 112 (1970); United States v. Pieragowski, 19 C.M.A. 508,
42 C.M.R. 110 (1970).62See, e.g., Moylan v. Laird, 305 F. Supp. 551 (D. R.I. 1969). The case distinguished
between use and possession of marijuana for purposes of service connection:
The court is frank to acknowledge that use of marijuana by servicemen, whether on
or off base, whether on or off duty, might well have special military significance.
Accordingly, the court accepts the reasoning of the Beeker decision in so far as it
deals with use of marijuana. However, possession is an entirely different matter. It
is a matter cognizable by the civilian sovereignties, who are presently busily coping
with it. No more so than the commission of other crimes does this particular crime
tend to undermine military authority.
Id. at 557.63E.g., Cole v. Laird, 468 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1972). Comparing the present case with
Moylan, preparatory to a Relford-type analysis, the court explained:
[The government] seeks to distinguish the case at bar.[from Moylan] on the
basis that Cole was charged with the use of marijuana. The only basis for making
this distinction is the Court of Military Appeals' opinion in Beeker. But... Beeker
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amenable to the "conduit" theory espoused by COMA,64 at least where
small amounts of marijuana were concerned. Even the distinction between
marijuana and "hard" drugs was not convincing to all federal courts.6 The
point to be made from the federal cases is that through the application of
the Relford criteria, the federal courts were reaching results inconsistent
with those reached in the military system. 66
The 1975-76 Term: Relford Fulfilled
The 1975-76 term saw the mandate of Relford fulfilled by COMA. It is
now clear that no blanket rule can be utilized by the military as an
alternative to conducting an inquiry along the lines set out in O'Callahan
and Relford. The first step in reaching this point was United States v.
Black.67  There the court foreshadowed its new emphasis on the literal
requirements of Relford:
rested on dicta in Williams to the effect that habitual narcotics use impairs the
readiness of troops for action. It is clear that marijuana does not rise to the level of
heroin or other physically addictive, "hard" drugs and the dangers associated with
its use - .hatever they may be - are not as great as those associated with heroin
and the like.
Id. at 833 (citation omitted).64See Lyle v. Kincaid, 344 F. Supp. 223 (M.D. Fla. 1972).65See Redmond v. Warner, 355 F. Supp. 812 (D. Haw. 1973), and Schroth v. Warner, 353
F. Supp. 1032 (D. Haw. 1973), where the court was unable rationally to support a distinction
between the rules applicable to marijuana on the one hand and controlled substances on the
other. The Fifth Circuit, however, true to its language in Cole v. Laird, 468 F.2d 829 (5th Cir.
1972), found service connection in sale and possession of heroin in 1975, holding that there is
a substantial variation between the interests of the military depending on whether the drug
involved was heroin or marijuana. Peterson v. Goodwin, 512 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1975).
661t had been hoped that the Supreme Court's decision in Schlesinger v. Councilman,
420 U.S. 738 (1975), would settle the issue. In that case, military authorities had been enjoined
from proceeding against the accused with a court-martial for sale, transfer and possession of
marijuana. However, the Court declined to reach the service connection question, holding
that Councilman had failed to exhaust his remedies within the military system and, as a
result, injunction would not lie. Id. at 753-60. Although the merits of service connection were
not discussed, there were some relevant dicta:
[I]f the offenses.., are not "service connected", the military courts will have had no
power to impose any punishment whatever. But that issue turns in major part on
gauging the impact of an offense on military discipline and effectiveness, on
determining whether the military interest in deterring the offense is distinct from
and greater than that of civilian society, and on whether the distinct military interest
can be vindicated adequately in civilian courts. These are matters of judgment that
often will turn on the precise set of facts in which the offense has occurred. See
Relford v. U.S. Disciplinary Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971). More importantly,
they are matters as to which the expertise of military courts is singularly relevant,
and their judgments indispensable to inform any eventual review in Art. III courts.
Id. at 760 (citation omitted).
Whatever the effect of this dicta on future resolutions of service connection issues, it was clear
that the Supreme Court intended that a Relford analysis be applied, even in light of'the
singularly relevant expertise of military courts on these questions. Happily, COMA has
recently conformed to that mandate.
6724 C.M.A. 162, 51 C.M.R. 381 (1976).
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Once it is judged that the overseas exception is not present in this
case, the inquiry must then advance to the stage of applying the
O'Callahan standard and the Relford criteria to determine whether there
exists "service connection" so as to vest jurisdiction in the military
nonetheless.68
United States v. Moore,6 9 while not a drug case, continued to
demonstrate COMA's new found emphasis on the literal application of
Relford. After setting out the text of the Relford criteria70 in the opinion,
the court said:
What Relford makes clear is the need for a detailed, thorough analysis
of the jurisdictional criteria .enunciated to resolve the service-connection
issue in all cases tried by court-martial. A more simplistic formula, while
perhaps desirable, was not deemed constitutionally appropriate by the
Supreme Court. It no longer is within our province to formulate such a
test.
... [The language of Relford] suggests that there may be instances in
which a crime committed off post against a fellow servicemember or the
service itself is not. triable by court-martial applying the more detailed
criteria previously outlined.7'
The court rejected what had previously been a nearly conclusive pre-
sumption of service connection when the victim of the crime was a
service member. 72 The court reaffirmed this position in United States v.
Hedlund7s when it said:
Under certain unusual circumstances, this factor [i.e., victim a service
member] alone might be enough to cause such a high degree of military
interest and concern as to compel jurisdiction in the military to try the
accused. However, in most instances, including the one now before us,
that is not the case. In fact, we believe that the degree of interest by the
military in this AWOL Marine is de minimus and, alone, will not result in
"service connection" as that term has come to be known.7 4
681d. at 167, 51 C.M.R. at 386 (foomotes omitted).
Judge Cook's dissent in Black focuses on two areas, the situs of the conspiracy and the
fact that the overt act (mailing of a letter and currency) affected the integrity of the military
postal system. Id. at 168, 51 C.M.R. at 387. The latter emphasis, which goes to one particular
balance struck when the Relford criteria are applied, was a portent of his concurrence in
United States v. McCarthy, 25 C.M.A. 30, 54 C.M.R. 30 (1976), which followed.
6924 C.M.A. 293, 52 C.M.R. 4 (1976). Petitioner devised a scheme at his off-base
residence, while not properly off post, to fake his own drowning to avoid further military
service. Assisted by his wife and a fellow airman, the accused also conspired to collect $20,000
under the accidental death provisions of the Serviceman's Group Life Insurance program by
falsely reporting the drowning incident. As a result of the false report, the accused's wife also
received a "death gratuity" out of Air Force appropriated funds.
7OSee note 61 supra.
7124 C.M.A. 293, 295, 52 C.M.R. 4, 6 (1976).
72For implicit recognition of this presumption see United States v. Hedlund, 25 C.M.A.
1, 3, 54 C.M.R. 1, 3 (1976).
7325 C.M.A. 1, 54 C.M.R. 1 (1976).
71Id. at 7, 54 C.M.R. at 7.
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Only one week after Hedlund, COMA met the issue of off-post drug
offenses head on.
In United States v. McCarthy75 appellant challenged the jurisdiction of
the general court-martial which tried him for wrongfully transferring three
pounds of marijuana to a fellow soldier "just outside" the gate of Fort
Campbell, Kentucky. After conducting a Relford-type analysis, the court
reached the conclusion that the accused's offense was service connected.76
But McCarthy is more than a simple application of the Relford standards
to drug cases, albeit in a fashion not utilized theretofore by COMA. This
case also indicates a growing recognition by the court that its simplistic
approach to drug-related offenses was wrong, and that civilian courts are
well-equipped to protect military interests at all times short of the point
where a drug offense attains special military significance through rigorous
application of Relford. The court said:
In so concluding, we wish to stress that this factual situation is
materially different under Relford than those in which off-duty servicemen
commit a drug offense while blended into the general civilian populace.
While it may very well h3e that a given civilian community takes a "hands-
off" approach to marihuana, that circumstance, in and of itself, is an
insufficient basis upon which to predicate military jurisdiction. To the
extent that United States v. Beeker, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 563, 40 C.M.R. 275
(1969), suggest a different approach in resolving drug offense jurisdictional
questions, it no longer should be considered a viable precedent of this
Court.
77
It appears that COMA has rejected the blanket rule in favor of the delicate
7525 C.M.A. 30, 54 C.M.R. 30 (1976).
76COMA quoted the Supreme Court's opinion in Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S.
738, 760 (1975), as to what the task of the service connection doctrine essentially was: "'The
issue requires careful balancing of the Relford factors to determine 'whether the military
interest in deterring the offense is distinct from and greater than that of civilian society, and
whether the distinct military interest can be vindicated adequately in civilian courts.' " 25
C.M.A. 30, 33, 54 C.M.R. 30, 33 (1976). The court concluded that
the four factors weighing in favor of military jurisdiction in this instance were
sufficient to vest the court-martial with jurisdiction ....
1. The formation of the criminal intent for the offense on-post.
2. The substantial connection between defendant's military duties and the
crime.
3. The transferee's being engaged in the performance of military duties,
known to the defendant, at the time the agreement to transfer was reached.
4. The threat posed to military personnel, and hence the military com-
munity itself, by the transfer of a substantial quantity of marihuana to a fellow
soldier who was a known drug dealer.
Id. at 34, 54 C.M.R. at 34. The facts show that appellant had become acquainted with the
transferee through a military unit. Knowing that he was a drug dealer, accused sold him three
pounds of marijuana, the physical transfer actually taking place outside the fort in
Montgomery County, Tennessee. It appeared that the drug transaction actually was arranged
in. the accused's unit on post even though the physical transfer occurred in the civilian
community. Id. at 33-34, 54 C.M.R. at 33-34.
77Id. at 35, 54 C.M.R. at 35 (citations omitted).
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ad hoc approach mandated by Relford. This seems to suggest the
possibility of a finding of no service connection in some variations of the
typical scenario proposed in the introduction to this section.
The McCarthy decision is also significant in that it helps to resolve a
problem left unanswered in Relford. While the Supreme Court articulated
a number of factors to be considered in making a determination regarding
service connection, it left unclear the weight to be given each factor, or
whether some factors might have a conclusive effect. In McCarthy, COMA
concluded that the four factors which pointed to service connection were
sufficient to overbalance the remaining eight.7 8 Thus it appears that
COMA regards as a more compelling case for service connection those
situations in which a drug offense is at least partially consummated on-
post and where military personnel in addition to the perpetrator of the
offense are involved.7 9 This is a rational distinction, supported bythe
policy of O'Callahan that the military should concern itself with those
situations in which it has a particular expertise or interest.
Judge Cook's Approach
Judge Cook has consistently taken a different approach to this
question. For example, in his concurrence in United States v. McCarthy o
he focused on the rights of indictment by grand jury and trial by jury that
O'Callahan was intended to provide. He reasoned that since under
Kentucky law McCarthy would have had neither a right to a jury trial, nor
to indictment by grand jury, O'Callahan would not serve to deny court-
martial jurisdiction. 81 And, since the offense charged could have been
prosecuted on information under federal law, the guarantee-of-indictment
justification for the bar to trial by court-martial was considered by Judge
Cook not to exist. He therefore saw no need to determine service
connection. In short, he views the justifications of O'Callahan, that is
grand jury indictment and jury trial, as also being the limits of the reach of
O'Callahan in questioning court-martial jurisdiction.
However, even if this analysis of O'Callahan is correct, Judge Cook's
reasoning also rests in major part on his conceptualization of the court-
78See note 76, supra.
79This again poses the problem of what to do in the case of a military undercover agent,
see note 59 supra. Viewing McCarthy with a special eye toward the dicta concerning offenses
blending into the civilian community, it may well be that COMA could distinguish, for
purposes of service connection, those situations where the military undercover agents pose as
civilians, fromr those in which the agents impersonate other military personnel.
8025 C.M.A. 30, 36, 54 C.M.R. 30, 36 (t976).
81As 'preserv[ing]... [the] two important constitutional guarantees' of indictment by
grand jury and trial by petit jury was the predicate perceived in O'Callahan v. Parker
for the limitation on the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction ... the unavailability of
those rights in state prosecutions eliminates the cognizability of the offense in the
state courts as a bar to trial by court-martial.
Id. at 36-37, 54 C.M.R. at 36-37 (citations omitted).
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martial members as "the functional equivalents of the jurors in a civilian
criminal trial .... ,,s2 This viewpoint ignores the obvious differences in
approach and background between civilian criminal trial juries and the
members of a court-martial. The Supreme Court has said:
[T]he essential feature of a jury obviously lies in the interposition between
the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of
laymen, and in the community participation and shared responsibility that
results from that group's determination of guilt or innocence. s
Compare this statement with Moyer's observations regarding the members
of a military court-martial:
USCMA has ruled that some constitutional limitations apply to the
process of court member selection. For example, commanders are
prohibited by fifth amendment due process requirements from system-
atically excluding identifiable groups from service on courts-martial.
. . . It is. nonetheless clear that commanders have wide discretion in
fashioning the composition of court panels. This personal authority is
obviously foreign to civilian practice; if applicable, constitutional guar-
antees of jury trial would require a far more representative military jury, if
not a system of random selection. . . . Under prevailing constitutional
interpretation, however, the selection process need conform only to the
requirements of article 25, UCMJ .... 11
The potential for prejudicial exercise of command influence in court
selection and instruction is also inherent in the military justice system.85 It
is reasonable to conclude that if the members of the court-martial are the
"functional equivalents" of civilian criminal juries, it is only in the sense
that both are triers of fact, and not in the larger sense contemplated by the
Supreme Court.
Nor is it clear that the only purpose of the service connection
requirement in O'Callahan was to insure the twin constitutional guar-
antees of grand jury indictment and trial by jury. There are inherent
differences between the military and civilian systems, if not necessarily in
the quality of justice, at least in the interests emphasized. COMA has.
construed the overseas exception to the subject matter jurisdiction require-
ment of O'Callahan as insuring a proceeding "as close as is possible to
affording all the rights and privileges to an accused in Anglo-American
jurisprudence. 86  Surely a construction of O'Callahan which grants
821d. at 37, 54 C.M.R. at 37. Judge Cook relies on Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970),
where the Supreme Court held that a criminal court jury may consist of less than the
customary twelve members.83Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).84
MoyER, supra note 2, § 2-585. See also id. at §§ 2-590 to 600.
ksMoYrE, supra note 2, §§ 3-200 to 225. See also Note, Self-incrimination in the Military
Justice System, 52 IND. L.J. - (1976), infra.86Unitgd States v. Black, 24 C.M.A. 162, 166, 51 C.M.R. 381, 385 (1976) (emphasis added).
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military jurisdiction in preference to civilian jurisdiction for the reasons,
suggested by Judge Cook flies in the face of this reading of O'Callahan.
Judge Cook has also emphasized the point made by the Supreme Court
in Schlesinger v. Councilman 7 that military courts have particular
expertise in evaluating the "military interest in deterring the offense"88 and
the possibility of vindicating that interest in civilian courts. However,
while these are indeed factors to be considered in determining service
connection, they are already included in the Relford criteria.8 9 They should
not be given weight independent of the Relford examination. Judge Cook
may still be advocating the use of the blanket rule that drug offenses are per
se service connected.
Conclusion
While COMA has finally dedicated itself to conforming to the mandate
of O'Callahan and Relford, it is unclear how the service connection issue
will be resolved in certain fact situations. One possible resolution is the
marijuana - "hard drugs" distinction adhered to by the Fifth Circuit90 The
court has a chance to break some new ground. There should be data on
drug use and abuse available now that were not available when Beeker was
decided in 1969. Such data could take the place of the court's previous
broad statements about drug use and could become a useful tool not only
for COMA, but also for other courts and legislatures faced with questions
involving drugs. COMA should also be careful not to lay down a blanket
rule of the opposite sort, as some may interpret the dicta regarding drug
offenses committed while blending into the civilian community to be.
While line drawing is difficult in an area involving as many variables as
service connection, the court must be true to the ad hoc approach of
Relford and seek to apply the criteria consistently with a view toward
balancing the military's interest in insuring discipline, morale and fitness
for duty with the constitutional preference for civilian jurisdiction expressed
in O'Callahan.
ROBERT PARKER
87420 U.S. 738 (1975). See note 68 supra.
88420 U.S. at 760. See note 68 supra.
89See note 61 supra, points 8 and 12.90See note 65 supra & text accompanying.
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